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1Abstract
Focusing on the case of Britain, this paper evaluates the role that EU
issue voting played in the 1992 and 1997 elections. EU issue voting
arises when the issue of European integration has a direct in￿uence on
vote choice by in￿uencing the attractiveness of party alternatives. In this
paper, we explore two di￿erent ways in which such in￿uence can occur:
elimination of party alternatives due to their EU stance or moderator of
the utility felt toward a subset of party alternatives that are all viable for
the voter. These two in￿uences are explored through a choice set logistic
regression model. The results suggest that EU issue voting increased
from 1992 to 1997, especially in England. However, compared with
traditional left-right issues, the in￿uence of EU issue voting remained
modest even in 1997, when public opinion had taken a Euroskeptic turn
and when the Conservative party was seen as much closer than Labour
on this issue.
2Introduction
A growing body of literature is concerned with the role of the European Union
in national elections. As an issue, European integration has been referred to
as a \sleeping giant" (Van der Eijk and Franklin, 2004). While potentially of
great importance, European integration has so far had relatively minor elec-
toral consequences. But contemporary research suggests the giant may be
awakening. Declining support for European integration, its growing salience
as an issue, and the rise of explicitly Euroskeptic parties all contribute to the
growing potential for EU issue voting.
Britain is one place where this transformation can be observed. In the
period between the 1992 and 1997 elections for the House of Commons, two
things happened. First, the British public became more Euroskeptic (Evans,
1998, 1999, 2001). Second, the conservative party grew more Euroskeptic,
increasing its distance from the Labour party on European integration, and
increasing this issue’s salience (Evans, 1998). The potential for EU issue
voting thus rose considerably, even though Evans (2001) concludes that this
potential remained unrealized by 1996.
As researchers begin to consider EU issue voting, several questions remain
about the precise role of this issue. Is the EU a primary decision criterion, i.e.,
one that voters use to eliminate parties from their consideration? Or is it a
secondary decision criterion, something that is applied to make a ￿nal choice
but is not used to screen parties? The answers to these questions are of
considerable importance because they result in a di￿erent appreciation of the
potency of EU issue voting. To the extent that parties are eliminated based
on their EU stance, the issue is more potent than when it serves as one of
several criteria that allow voters to make a ￿nal choice among parties that are
all reasonable choices for them.
This paper is a ￿rst e￿ort to answer the question of how the EU enters
voters decision calculus. Using the British elections of 1992 and 1997 as our
\laboratory," we ask if and how EU issue voting in￿uenced voting behavior.
Our analytic vehicle is a choice set logistic regression model that allows us to
explore whether the EU was a primary or secondary consideration in shaping
vote choice in Britain.
EU Issue Voting: The Story So Far
An expanding body of research indicates that European matters play a role
in national politics, particularly in national electoral politics. Rising salience
3and con￿ict regarding the EU in the post-Maastricht era have resulted in what
some scholars term a \constraining dissensus," whereby European citizens and
political parties alike actively monitor the course of integration and where nec-
essary voice their fears and objections (Hooghe and Marks, 2009). Indeed,
there is ample evidence of the growing politicization of the EU in domestic
politics. The large body of research on citizen support for European integra-
tion in both Western and Eastern Europe points to perceptions of economic
bene￿t and social identity as factors in￿uencing public opinion (e.g., Gabel,
1998; McLaren, 2002; Carey, 2002; Tucker et al., 2002; Elg￿ un and Tillman,
2007). Moreover, political parties are no longer turning a blind eye to Eu-
ropean publics on such matters, but are instead taking increasingly open and
distinguishable positions on European integration that are at least minimally
responsive to citizens attitudes (Carrubba, 2001; Steenbergen et al., 2007).
Often this has come at a high price for political parties, as intra-party dissent
over European integration has become manifest in party systems throughout
Europe (Edwards, 2008). Taken together, this suggests the development of a
range of structured public opinion and di￿erentiated party positions on Euro-
pean integration, leading Van der Eijk and Franklin (2004) to describe the EU
issue as a \sleeping giant" in electoral politics.
The in￿uence of EU issues on domestic electoral politics can occur through
a number of ways. It can take place indirectly, either through the in￿uence of
European Parliamentary elections on national voting behavior (e.g. Van der
Eijk and Franklin, 1996; Van der Eijk et al., 1996; Marsh 1998) or through
the impact of European integration on economic voting in national elections
(e.g. Scheve, 1999; Bohrer and Tan 2000; Tillman, 2008). But it also can
occur directly through a mechanism referred to as EU issue voting. EU issue
voting is the process whereby individual preferences over European integration
in￿uence vote choices in national elections (Tillman, 2004; De Vries, 2007).
The ￿rst study into the extent of EU issue voting was conducted in the
context of the British elections by Geo￿rey Evans (1998, 1999, 2001). Evans’
work demonstrated for the ￿rst time that EU attitudes could matter in national
elections. Although the e￿ect of EU issue voting on the results of the 1997 and
2001 elections to the House of Commons may not have been decisive, Evans’
work demonstrates that two factors increased the extent and importance the
EU issue in British politics: First, the British public became more Euroskeptic.
Second, the Conservatives grew increasingly Euroskeptic thus moving closer
to the British median voter. Although the Tories were not able to reap the
electoral bene￿t due to a high level of internal dissent on the issue (Evans,
1998), the sleeping giant was stirring in the 1997 and 2001 British elections.
4In keeping with Evans’ work, recent studies also provide evidence of EU
issue voting. This research shows that the degree to which voters’ positions on
European matters in￿uence their vote choice varies cross-nationally depending
on the level of EU issue salience among the electorate, the choices o￿ered by
political parties regarding European issues as well as speci￿c EU events such
as an EU Treaty referendum or (Turkish) accession. In his examination of
Austria, Finland, and Sweden, for example, Tillman (2004) ￿nds evidence of
EU issue voting at the time of accession, a period in which EU membership
can be assumed to have been salient and at least somewhat divisive. Simi-
larly, De Vries (2007) ￿nds evidence of EU issue voting in Denmark and the
United Kingdom, two countries characterized by high levels of partisan con￿ict
over Europe, yet fails to ￿nd such evidence in Germany or the Netherlands,
where partisan con￿ict over the EU is far more limited. Looking at the 2005
German elections, Schoen (2008) argues that attitudes towards Turkey’s po-
tential accession to the EU played an important role, with voters being more
likely to support parties that held closer positions to their own on the Turkish
question. Taken together, these ￿ndings suggest that European issues can
in￿uence domestic elections in situations where there are signi￿cant elite and
public disagreements over European integration. Finally, in a recent study De
Vries (2009) highlights the importance of EU referenda for the development of
EU issue voting. By means of a quasi-experiment which compares two Dutch
elections (one before and one after the EU referendum on the Constitutional
Treaty in 2005), she demonstrates that the EU referendum induced EU issue
voting in Dutch elections by raising the degree of party con￿ict as well as
voter salience regarding Europe. However, these EU e￿ects in the 2006 par-
liamentary elections are relatively modest. European integration is still merely
of secondary concern to Dutch voters, though the EU referendum did bring
the issue closer to home.
Despite the fact that scholars have focused on the extent and the e￿ects
EU issue voting within the national political arena for almost a decade now,
we have very limited insight into the exact process by which EU attitudes
play a role in voters’ choices at the national ballot box. Several key questions
remain. For example, is the EU a primary decision criterion, i.e., one that
voters use to eliminate parties from their consideration? Or is it a secondary
decision criterion, something that is applied to make a ￿nal choice but is
not used to screen parties? The answers to these questions are of crucial
importance as they allow us to judge the extent to which EU attitudes really
matter. By conceptualizing EU issue voting as a two-stage process in which
voters ￿rst voters narrow down the number of options presented to them on
5the ballot by ￿ltering out those that are viable (the consideration stage) and
second utilize additional information to choose among the alternatives within
the consideration set (the choice stage) leads to a di￿erent and more balanced
appreciation of the potency of EU issue voting. To the extent that parties are
eliminated based on their EU stance, the issue is more potent than when it
serves as one of several criteria that allow voters to make a ￿nal choice among
parties that are all reasonable choices for them.
Considerations and Choices: The Development of EU
Issue Voting
Complex societies produce diverse con￿icts over public policy. Indeed, the
number of potential policy issues that voters can consider when casting their
ballot is almost in￿nite. This raises the question under which conditions can
we expect relatively (new) policy issues, like European integration, to in￿uence
voting behavior? This issue has been addressed by several prominent scholars
within political science (Campbell, et al., 1960; Schattschneider, 1960; Riker,
1982; Sundquist, 1983; Carmines and Stimson, 1986, 1989; Franklin, et al.,
1992; Stimson, 2004). A large array of factors, such as critical events or new
party entry, are viewed as important pieces of the puzzle concerning why some
issues in￿uence voters’ voting decisions while others do not.
In this study, we change our focus to the decision process that voters use
when making up their minds. Sometimes new issues arise which are explosive
in nature. In terms of choice behavior, these become primary decision criteria,
competing with old criteria. For example, until the 1850s traditional agrarian-
commercial cleavages dominated American politics, favoring Democrats in the
South and West and Republicans in the North. However, gradually the issue of
slavery had inserted itself into the political debate, creating cracks in particular
within the Democratic camp. By 1860, the issue had become so divisive as
to produce an outright realignment and, of course, the Civil War. It had
become clear that, especially in the South, slavery had become the primary
criterion by which politics was judged. At other times, issue evolution is more
glacial. Perhaps an issue becomes a secondary decision criterion ￿rst, i.e,
the issue serves as a criterion by which voters choose among viable options.
Eventually, the issue may move toward being the primary criterion, at which
time it decides if alternatives are even worth considering. This seems to be
the case for abortion in the U.S. context for example (Adams, 1997).
Traditional models of issue evolution focus mainly on the ￿rst instance,
6i.e. a situation in which new issues become the primary decision criteria,
competing with or even replacing the old criteria (Carmines and Stimson, 1986,
1989). The term issue evolution refers to the emergence and development of
issues that invoke public interest, which under the condition of long-lasting
divisiveness will eventually alter the link between voters and parties and lead
to mass (re-) alignment (Carmines and Stimson, 1989: 11).
The model proposed by Carmines and Stimson (1986) is intrinsically top-
down, i.e. it is derived from the assumption that party elites set in the process
of political change, which will eventually result in mass (re-)alignment. More-
over, it develops a sequence in which elite stances on an issue may result in
mass realignment. The ￿rst step is the (re-) phrasing of a contentious issue in
partisan terms. Vote-seeking, that is the maximization of votes, constitutes
the overriding objective of political parties (Downs, 1957). Hence, political
parties may have an incentive to introduce or promote an issue within elec-
toral competition, if they feel that this could result in an increase of votes or
eventually upset an existing majority. In this respect, the authors also stress
the importance of critical moments (Carmines and Stimson, 1986: 902). Ex-
ternal developments (i.e. outside of the control of political parties) may draw
attention to particular issues. Importantly, in a second step voters must be
aware of the di￿erences in the position of the parties on the new issue. This
is what Carmines and Stimson (1986: 902-903) refer to as clarity. Following
the elite reorientations on contentious issues, the mass public must take on
the cues of party elites and form clear preferences on this issue. The clarity
of party preferences is not su￿cient, however: the new issue must evoke an
emotional response among citizens. Hence, the third step highlights the fact
that voters must also care about this issue. This is labeled as a￿ect in the
model by Carmines and Stimson (1986: 902-903). When these conditions
are met, increased polarization of issue attitudes will occur and the issue will
eventually change mass identi￿cation as the new issue becomes the primary
decision criteria, competing or even replacing old criteria (Carmines and Stim-
son, 1986: 902-903). The ￿nal outcome of this process is a realignment of
the party system and electorate.
These kind of explosive issues that bring out realignment are most likely the
outliers within the population of all political issues. Most political issues may
impact political competition and voters decisions, but do so more gradually. As
such an extension of the issue evolution model to also include gradual changes
is in order. This study attempts to tackle the issue of gradual evolution by
focusing on the di￿erent ways in which new issues may play out in voters’
decisions.
7Traditional models of voting behavior often assume (implicitly or explicitly)
that voters consider all of the available alternatives. In keeping with research
in economics and consumer research (e.g. Manski 1977; Wright and Barbour
1977) and psychology (Tversky 1979), we view voters choices in elections
as a two-stage process consisting of a consideration and a choice stage. In
the consideration stage voters screen parties based on general information
heuristics (such as class or partisanship) and eliminate alternatives. In this ￿rst
stage, then, voters narrow down the number of options presented to them on
the ballot by ￿ltering out those that are viable. In a second and ￿nal stage,
voters utilize additional information to choose among the alternatives enclosed
in the consideration set, should there still be more than one alternative left.
This second stage is labeled the choice stage.
The distinction between the consideration and choice stages matters for
issue evolution in the following way. Since most issues of all potential political
concerns are not likely to be realigning in nature, we may expect the majority
of new issues to impact elections and vote choice more gradually. We coin this
process gradual issue evolution. In the case of gradual issue evolution, an issue
starts a secondary decision criterion. That is, the issue in￿uences the choice
stage but not the consideration stage. Put di￿erently, the issue is not (yet) of
such great importance that it is used to eliminate alternatives. Over time, such
an issue may become a primary decision criterion, i.e., a screening mechanism
to remove alternatives from consideration. If issue evolution is more abrupt
or radical, of course, the issue will start as a primary decision criterion. As
the issue loses importance, it might become of secondary importance or lose
in￿uence completely. Figure 1 depicts the connection between issue evolution
and choice.
When studying the electoral change, we argue that the ￿rst question any
author needs to address is the following: Is the issue a primary decision cri-
terion, i.e., one that voters use to eliminate parties from their consideration
or is it a secondary decision criterion, something that is applied to make a
￿nal choice but is not used to screen parties? One can think of radical issue
evolution by means of a Litmus test. When voters use an issue as a means to
screen parties, parties have to pass on this issue in order to become considered
by voters, much like candidate judges for the Supreme Court who screened on
their views regarding abortion or (strict) constitutionalism before they become
o￿cial nominees.
This study applies these ideas to EU issue voting. Previous work in this
area conceives of EU issue voting solely in terms of the choice stage. It is
likely that this may have lead to an underestimation of the importance of EU
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Figure 1: Issue Evolution and Electoral Decision-Making
9issue voting for national politics. When voters use the EU issue as a means to
screen parties, the e￿ect of the EU issue on national politics may considerable,
while when it serves as one of several criteria that allow voters to make a ￿nal
choice among parties that are all reasonable choices for them the impact of
the EU issue is likely less strong. When parties’ EU stances ￿rst have to pass a
Litmus test, we may actually be witnessing a process of radical issue evolution
which could over time bring about changes in the underlying structures of party
and electoral competition and mass electoral behavior.
Choice Set Logistic Regression
How does one distinguish between primary and secondary decision making in
a choice model? To do so, one needs to formulate a fundamentally di￿erent
type of model than is commonly used in political science. Conventional choice
models, including conditional logit and multinomial probit, implicitly assume
that decision makers consider all of the available alternatives. In these models,
there is no possibility of distinguishing between primary and secondary decision
criteria. These models, then, will not work to answer the questions we ask.
Choice set logistic regression (CSLR) is a model that allows us to distin-
guish between consideration and choice stages and thus allows us to estimate
the impact of the EU in each stage. The model estimates both the probability
of including an alternative in the choice set and, given a particular choice set,
the conditional probability of selecting the alternative. No data about choice
sets need to be elicited. It is su￿cient to have data about the ￿nal choices
that decision makers make.
To formalize the model, let M be the universe of alternatives, in our case
political parties; assume there are m such alternatives. Let C ￿ M be a
particular choice set, where we exclude the empty choice set. We can construct
2m￿1 such choice sets, which can be collected into the power set G. Let ￿q(C)
be the probability that voter q chooses choice set C; we call this the choice set
probability. This probability re￿ects the decision process in the consideration
stage. Further, let ￿q(ijC) be the probability of choosing alternative i from
choice set C; we call this the conditional choice probability. This probability
re￿ects the decision process of the choice stage. Then, the unconditional
probability of choosing alternative i, i.e., ￿q(i), follows straightforwardly from
the laws of probability:
￿q(i) =
X
C2G
￿q(ijC)￿q(C) (1)
10(Manski 1977). It is now a matter of formulating decision models for each of
the decision stages to work out the unconditional choice probabilities on the
left-hand side of (1).
Consideration Stage
The consideration stage can be thought of in terms of screening of the al-
ternatives. Let zqi be a vector of screening rules. Further, let z0
qi￿ be the
weighted sum of these screening rules. Then an alternative i is included into
the choice set if
z0
qi￿ + ￿qi > ￿i (2)
Here ￿qi is a stochastic component, consisting of unobserved factors that
may in￿uence the appeal of a particular alternative. The parameter ￿i is an
acceptability threshold: the overall appeal of the alternative has to exceed this
threshold before it is included into the choice set.
One way in which the EU can in￿uence vote choice is through the screening
mechanism. Including the distance between a voter and the parties on the
EU in zqi, one obtains a model in which alternatives are at least partially
screened on their EU stance. Note that in our setup, the EU stance could be
compensated for by other elements of zqi. Nevertheless, too discrepant an EU
stance could lead to disquali￿cation of a party by the voter.
We now turn (2) into an inclusion probability by making the assumption
that the ￿qi are independently, standard logistic distributed. It then follows
that the inclusion probability for an alternative is given by
!qi =
1
1 + exp(￿i ￿ z0
qi￿)
(3)
Equation (3) speci￿es a regular logit model for each alternative in M.
The choice set probabilities are now easily constructed. Given the inde-
pendence assumption on ￿qi, it follows that
￿q(C) =
Q
i2C !qi
Q
j = 2C(1 ￿ !qj)
1 ￿ Pr(Empty)
(4)
The numerator in (4) is the product of the inclusion probabilities of the in-
cluded alternatives times the product of the exclusion probabilities of the ex-
cluded alternatives. The denominator is a normalizing factor to account for
the exclusion of the empty choice set.
11Choice Stage
In the choice stage, an alternative is selected from the choice set. Here, we
assume that voters are utility maximizers and choose the alternative with the
highest utility. Thus, alternative i is selected from the choice set if Uqi > Uqj
8j 6= i 2 C. Assuming that utility has a ￿xed and random component and that
the ￿xed component is a linear function of a vector of attributes, xqi, this can
be expressed as:
xqi￿ + ￿qi > xqj￿ + ￿qj (5)
8j 6= i 2 C. Here ￿q: is a random component and ￿ is a parameter vector.
Assuming that the random components follow independent Gumbel distribu-
tions, we can express the conditional choice probabilities as conditional logit
models (McFadden 1974):
￿q(ijC) =
exp(x0
qi￿)
P
j2C exp(x0
qj￿)
(6)
Note that ￿q(ijC) = 0 if i = 2 C and ￿q(ijC) = 1 if C = fig.
Estimation
Estimation of the CSLR is complicated by the fact that the likelihood func-
tion is not guaranteed to be strictly log-concave. This problem arises when
the parameters in the consideration stage become so large, as to push the
inclusion probabilities to essentially one, such that further increasing the pa-
rameters doesn’t a￿ect the inclusion probability { and hence the likelihood {
anymore. Standard optimizers run the risk of landing in a ￿at region, leading
to convergence problems. Note that this is an optimization problem only. The
likelihood function has a unique maximum and is locally log-concave around
this maximum.
The optimization problem can be resolved in a number of di￿erent ways.
Here, we opt for incorporating weakly informative Cauchy(0,2.5) priors (Gel-
man et al. 2008). These priors add very little information and hence, do
not bias the results too much (and if they do, it is in a downward direction).
However, they stabilize the posterior, rendering it globally strictly log-concave.
We then use a standard optimizer, the BFGS algorithm, to approximate the
mode of the posterior.
12The 1992 and 1997 British Elections
Background
Studying the 1992 and 1997 elections for the House of Commons provides
one with a unique opportunity to assess EU issue voting. In 1992, the EU
was a minor issue. While British voters were not wildly enthusiastic about the
EU, neither were they strong Euroskeptics. And the distance between Labour
on the Conservatives on the EU was relatively small (Evans 2001). In all,
these conditions were less than favorable for observing EU issue voting in the
elections. By 1997, this had all changed. The Conservatives had begun to
give considerable weight to the issue. At the same time, the British public
had become quite Euroskeptic and was also giving greater weight to the issue.
Finally, the Conservatives had moved their position, increasing the distance
to Labour and taking a stance much closer to the typical Brit (Evans 2001).
In sum, by 1997 the conditions for EU issue voting had become much more
favorable.
These shifts can be clearly observed in Figures 2 and 3, which depict mean
voter and perceived party positions on the EU in 1992 and 1997 for England
and Scotland, respectively. These horizontal scale in these pictures runs from
pro-European attitudes on the left to anti-European attitudes on the right. It
is clear that voters shifted in anti-EU direction from 1992 to 1997. They also
perceived that the Conservatives had moved in this direction. If anything, they
deemed Labour to be more pro-EU in 1997 than it had been in 1992. Thus,
perceived party polarization was a reality by 1997, providing fertile ground for
EU issue voting.
At the same time that voter and party positions shifted, so did the perceived
importance of the EU. In 1992, 42.6 percent of voters indicated that the EU
was (extremely) important for their vote. By 1997, this number had increased
to 56 percent. Clearly, issue salience had increased, further adding to the
favorable conditions for EU issue voting.
Britain is thus a perfect case for studying EU issue voting over time. On
the whole, one would expect to see an increase in EU issue voting moving
from 1992 to 1997. An open question is whether this increase manifested
itself through using the EU as a primary decision criterion or a secondary
decision criterion. That question plays a central role in our analysis, along
with the question of how EU issue voting compares with voting on the basis
of traditional left-right issues.
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Figure 2: Shifting EU Positions in England 1992-97
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Figure 3: Shifting EU Positions in Scotland 1992-97
14Data, Model Speci￿cation, and Measures
Data The data for this paper come from the British Election Studies 1992-
97 panel survey (Heath, Jowell, and Curtice 1998). We separately analyze
the data for English and Scottish respondents. For England, we consider
vote choice among three alternatives: the Conservatives, Labour, and the
Liberal Democrats. For Scotland, we consider a fourth alternative as well: the
Scottish National Party (SNP).
Model Speci￿cation Our modeling strategy is to estimate three di￿erent
models of EU issue voting. The ￿rst model, includes subjective class indica-
tors in the ￿rst stage and the EU, traditional left-right issues, and economic
retrospections in the second stage. This model is in keeping with a long lit-
erature suggesting the primary role of social class in voting behavior (Butler
and Stokes 1969; Evans 1999). This literature suggests that class is a primary
decision criterion in British elections, albeit one that may have lost some of
its in￿uence over time (Franklin 1985). By contrast, the EU is assumed to
be a secondary criterion in the ￿rst model. In this model, then, the perceived
EU stance of parties is not used to eliminate alternatives. Rather, this stance
is used only to choose among a set of acceptable alternatives and only then
when the screening stage has left more than one party in the consideration
set.
In the second model, we move the EU from the choice to the consideration
stage of the CSLR. Here, it competes with class as a screening mechanism.
Traditional left-right issues and economic retrospections remain in the sec-
ond stage. This model allows us to determine to what extent parties were
eliminated from further consideration based on their EU stance.
The third model keeps the EU in the choice stage but moves traditional
left-right issues to the consideration stage of the CSLR. The purpose of this
model is to compare the in￿uence of the EU (Model 2) to traditional left-right
issues (Model 3) as a screening mechanism.
The models are identical for England and Scotland, with the following ex-
ception. In Scotland, we include an additional screening mechanism: whether
a voter desires Scotland to be independent or not. This should be an impor-
tant screening mechanism, in particular, for the SNP. Consequently, the EU
issue competes with both class and nationalism as a screening mechanism in
Scotland.
15Measures We use two social class indicators: working and middle class.
They take on the value one if a voter identi￿es with the working class or
middle class, respectively. The baseline category consists of voters without a
subjective class identity.
For Scottish independence, we use on a question concerning the power
of the Scottish Assembly. Several response options allude to the desire for
independence of Scotland (either insider or outside of the EU). Voters receive
a score of one if they expressed such a desire and zero otherwise.
Economic retrospections refer to perceptions of the development of the
economy in the previous year. They run from perceptions that the British
economy got worse to perceptions that it got better. In general, negative
economic perceptions should hurt the incumbent party (the Conservatives in
both 1992 and 1997).
Traditional economic left-right issues are captured through four questions
about policy priorities. The ￿rst concerns whether government should try to
get people back to work versus keeping prices down. The second concerns
the question of whether spending and taxes should increase versus decrease.
The third concerns privatization versus nationalization of businesses. The
￿nal issue concerns whether incomes should be made more equal. For each
of these issues, we de￿ned the absolute distance between the voter’s own
position and his/her perception of the party positions. Since all of these issues
are clearly economic left-right issues|as is clear from a factor analysis of the
self-placements, which yields a clear single factor with that interpretation|we
averaged the four distances to obtain a single measure.
Finally, the EU issue is de￿ned in terms of uniting fully with the European
Union versus retaining Britain’s independence. Here, we de￿ned again the
absolute distance between a voter’s own placement and that of the political
parties (see Figures 2 and 3).
Results
How did the EU issue evolve as a consideration in shaping vote choice in Britain
between 1992 and 1997? We answer this question by considering England and
Scotland separately. We do so because the pattern of issue evolution seems
to have been di￿erent in these two countries. In both locations, there is
evidence of growing EU issue voting. In England this has taken the form of
growing importance of the EU as a primary decision criterion, i.e., a screening
mechanism. By contrast, in Scotland the changed importance of the EU seems
to have worked its way primarily through a secondary decision criterion.
16Table 1: Average Partial E￿ects of EU (England 1992)
Model 1 Model 2
England 92: max min max min
Conservatives 0.32 0.54 0.45 0.52
Labour 0.17 0.37 0.18 0.37
Liberal Dems 0.08 0.26 0.05 0.21
EU Issue Voting in England 1992-97
Figure 4 shows the 1992 coe￿cients for the ￿rst and second model speci￿-
cations, where EU issue voting is conceived of as a secondary versus primary
decision criterion. The plot shows the posterior mode, as well as the 95 per-
cent credible intervals. There is evidence of EU issue voting in 1992, both in
the form of a screening mechanism and a secondary choice criterion. The EU
coe￿cient for the ￿rst model is -.243, while it is -.188 for the second model.
When translated into average marginal e￿ects, we obtain the results in
Table 1. These average partial e￿ects move the EU distance for one party from
minimum to maximum while holding everything else at the actual observed
values. The entries in Table 1 re￿ect the average over the observations.
Importantly, the e￿ects of EU issue voting are most pronounced when the EU
is a secondary consideration. For instance, moving the Conservatives from
the maximum to the minimum distance on the EU increase the probability of
voting for them by .22 points when the EU is a secondary consideration and by
.07 when he EU is a primary consideration. The results for Labour are similar.
Only for the Liberal Democrats does it appear that the EU issue vote mattered
about equally as a primary and secondary consideration.
It should be noted that the impact of EU issue voting was relatively minor
compared to traditional left-right issues in 1992. In model 1, where the EU
and economic left-right compete in the choice stage, the left-right coe￿cient
(-.918) is almost four times greater than the EU coe￿cient (-.243). 1 And
when left right is considered a screening mechanism, as we do in the third
model, then its coe￿cient (-.831) is also considerably larger than that of the
EU as screening mechanism. Clearly, EU issue voting was a signi￿cant factor
in 1992, but of relative lesser importance than economic left-right issues.
1Note that the coe￿cients of these two issue dimensions can be directly compared as
they are on the same scale.
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18Table 2: Average Partial E￿ects of EU (England 1997)
Model 1 Model 2
England 97: max min max min
Conservatives 0.20 0.40 0.23 0.36
Labour 0.25 0.53 0.23 0.51
Liberal Dems 0.07 0.26 0.1 0.23
How did this all change in 1997? Figure 5 shows the posteriors for models
1 and 2 in 1997. In the model where the EU enters the choice stage (model
1), we see that the 1997 coe￿cient is slightly smaller than the 1992 coe￿-
cient: -.224 versus -.243. This change is so small as to be of no substantive
importance; for all intents and purposes, we can argue that the impact of EU
issue voting in the choice stage has remained constant from 1992 to 1997.
By contrast, there is clear evidence of the increased importance of the EU as
a screening rule. By 1997, the EU coe￿cient in the second model was -.300
(in contrast to -.188 in 1992). This suggests that English voters started to
use the EU to weed out parties.
There is clear evidence of this in the average partial e￿ects. As Table 2
shows, changes in EU distance still left a signi￿cant mark on the probability of
voting for a particular party when the EU served as a secondary consideration.
But compared to Table 1, there is now clear evidence of the EU also having
strong e￿ects when conceived of as a primary decision criterion. In all, then,
there is good evidence for the increased importance of EU issue voting in
England by 1997.
Again, the impact of EU issue voting should be contrasted with that of the
economic left-right dimension. When this is done for the ￿rst model, we see
that the EU remained a minor issue compared to economic left-right: the left
right coe￿cient (-.835) continues to be about four times larger than the EU
coe￿cient in 1997 compared to 1992. As a screening mechanism, however,
the EU had caught up some with left-right in 1997: the ratio of the EU versus
left-right coe￿cients was -.3 to -.919 in 1997 versus -.188 to -.831 in 1992.
EU Issue Voting in Scotland 1992-97
How did the EU issue evolve in Scottish voting behavior in the period 1992-97?
To answer this question, we now include the SNP in the analysis. Additionally,
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20Table 3: Average Partial E￿ects of EU (Scotland 1992)
Model 1 Model 2
Scotland 92: max min max min
Conservatives 0.16 0.30 0.22 0.27
Labour 0.19 0.39 0.1 0.4
Liberal Dems 0.04 0.14 0.02 0.15
SNP 0.16 0.32 0.13 0.33
we consider the role of Scottish independence in vote choice.
For 1992, the results for models 1 and 2 are shown in Figure 6. When
playing the role of a secondary decision criterion (model 1), the EU coe￿cient
is -.192. As a screening mechanism, the EU played a bigger role in Scotland
in 1992: the coe￿cient is -.33.
Table 3 considers the marginal partial e￿ects due to EU issue voting for
both models. In general, the e￿ects of the EU are more pronounced for the
model in which the EU serves as a screening mechanism (model 2) than for
the model in which it serves as a secondary consideration (model 1). These
e￿ects were computed identically to England.
These results should be judged in light of the other predictors. Comparing
the EU to left-right economic issues, its e￿ect in model 1 is relatively minor: -
.192 versus -.791. As a screening mechanism, too, the EU seems to have been
less important in 1992, its coe￿cient of -.33 in model 2 being quite a bit smaller
than the left-right coe￿cient of -.868 in model 3. Both of these screening
mechanisms seem less relevant than the question of whether Scotland should
be independent. Scotsmen favoring such independence were considerably more
likely to include the SNP and less likely to include the Tories.
By 1997, something interesting had happened, which contrasts with the
pattern observed in England. As a secondary decision criterion, the EU gained
in importance (with a coe￿cient of -.346 in 1997 versus -.192 in 1992). As a
screening rule, however, the issue lost importance, with the coe￿cient dropping
from -.33 to -.212. Figure 7 shows the parameter estimates for 1997.
The change in EU issue voting had implications for the choice probabilities.
As Table 4 reveals, the EU issue had relatively mild e￿ects on vote probabilities
when considered as a screening mechanism. Its e￿ects as a secondary attribute
seem to have been a bit stronger, however, especially when considering the
electoral fortunes of Labour.
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22Figure 7: Posterior Estimates Scotland 1997
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23Table 4: Average Partial E￿ects of EU (Scotland 1997)
Model 1 Model 2
Scotland 97: max min max min
Conservatives 0.08 0.18 0.13 0.16
Labour 0.30 0.57 0.43 0.54
Liberal Dems 0.05 0.20 0.06 0.2
SNP 0.09 0.23 0.08 0.19
Again, the e￿ect of EU issue voting should not be exaggerated. It seems
to have been mild when compared to left-right ideology. The e￿ect of this
was almost ￿ve times larger in model 1 (-1.454). In Model 2, it was almost
four times greater (model 3 coe￿cient of left-right economic ideology was
-.750). As with the 1992 analysis, the impact of Scottish independence was
particularly strong.
Discussion
We see clear evidence of the importance of the EU in the British case. While
the EU was not without electoral consequences in 1992, in certain ways its
impact had strengthened by 1997. In England, this strengthening occurred in
the consideration stage, with English voters using party’s EU stance to decide
if that party was an acceptable alternative. In Scotland, the strengthening
occurred in the choice stage. And the decreasing weight of the EU as a
screening mechanism from 1992 to 1997, makes it more di￿cult to conclude
that the EU had clearly evolved into a more important issue for Scottish voters
by 1997.
The diverging patterns of issue evolution qua decision criteria in England
and Scotland are unexpected. An obvious explanation is missing. As Figures
2 and 3 reveal, voter EU positions and their perceptions of the parties shifted
analogously in England and Scotland. There is also no evidence of signi￿cantly
di￿erent saliences of the EU in England and Scotland in 1997 (or, for that
matter, 1992). While Scottish independence is a factor that played a role in
Scotland and not England, it is not clear that this issue became much more
decisive from 1992 to 1997 so as to change the impact of the EU.
More work will need to be done to ascertain why the issue evolution paths
of England and Scotland diverged.Perhaps the unique nature of the 1997 elec-
24tions played a role here. These elections returned Labour to power and may
have had a unique dynamic that can account for the anomalous patterns in
Scotland. In this regard, an analysis of the 2001 elections, when the Conser-
vatives campaigned even more intensely on the EU issue, may be worthwhile.
Conclusions
Has the EU ceased to be a sleeping giant? That is, has it begun to in￿uence
electoral behavior?An a￿rmative answer to these questions would suggest
that the issue has evolved in the sense of becoming a de￿ning element of the
political landscape.
A long literature on issue evolution has debated how issues cease to be
sleeping giants. That literature has been silent, however, on the question of
how new issues enter voters’ decision processes. In this paper, we have de-
veloped a model that ties issue evolution directly to choice. We have argued
that issues may come to a￿ect electoral behavior in two di￿erent ways. Some-
times, issues are so explosive that they become criteria by which voters screen
alternatives. They decide, based on the issue, whether a party alternative is
acceptable or not. At other times, an issue’s impact is less dramatic. Vot-
ers decide, based on other criteria, if alternatives are acceptable or not. In
this way, they assemble a choice set of viable alternatives. The new issue then
helps them to choose among those alternatives but no alternative is eliminated
because of its stance on the new issue.
We also developed a statistical model that allows one to assess the deci-
sion path by which a new issue in￿uences vote choice. The choice set logis-
tic regression model distinguishes between a consideration and choice stage
in decision making. The consideration stage is a screening stage, whereby
unattractive alternatives are eliminated, The choice stage entails the selection
of one alternative from within a subset of viable options.
Based on this statistical model, there is clear evidence that the EU is-
sue ceased to sleep, at least in England when observing the period 1992-97.
Whether it ceased to be a sleeping giant is less clear. While the EU gained
in importance, the British elections in 1997 continued to be dominated by
left-right economic issues. Thus, the giant is awakening but still has a lot of
growing to do before dramatically altering electoral outcomes.
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